My father, a ordnance officer in one of the B26 groups remembered the arguments over much of this & a number of other matters. He refered to multiple schools of thought on the most efficient courses in their general mission. His remembrance included remarks that can be summed up as ''Those knotheads had us doing what we knew would not work.' The term "knotheads" seemed to refer to a Brit as well as a couple USAAF generals.
Carl,
I don't have the original source documents to answer the question of light flak numbers on German airfields in France.
I don't think the numbers are knowable, given the German use of flak decoys messing with Allied flak intelligence and the chaotic retreat from France doing in German records.
As far as bomber tactics in the ETO, the 9th AF took so many casualties during the raid at Ijmuiden that the Bomber Barons turned their backs on low level attack and essentially stuck bannanas in their ears and said "Naa-Naa-Naa I can hear you" when Kenney's AAR's flowed in from the Pacific.
AFAIK, there no single attempt to use air laid smoke to block German daylight light flak fire in the way Kenney's 5th AF did against Japanese light flak in New Guinea and particularly while raiding Rabaul.
What I know on the subject of WW2 American medium bombers and flak is from the following sources --
1) "THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD PHASE TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 5 May 1944 - 8 May 1945" Prepared by THE ARMY AIR FORCES EVALUATION BOARD IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS August 1945
page 310
It is vulnerable to flak at altitudes below 10,000 feet. Fifty guns is the maximum density normally acceptable for attack of a defended target without excessive losses. Vulnerability to flak precludes its use in low-level attacks on targets against which the fighter-bomber can be employed without excessive losses.
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Other limitations of an operational nature are: Runways must be of 5 500 feet minimum length, and capable of sustaining 30,000 lb. loads. To obtain an effective density of bomb pattern, medium bombers should not be employed in formations of less than six.
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The use of the synchronous bomb sight in level bombing, requires 2000 feet minimum altitude, and a straight and level bomb run of from 30 to 60 seconds.
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Fighter escort is necessary if air opposition is likely to be encountered.
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Due to the foregoing and other tactical considerations, medium bomber missions cannot be hurriedly arranged, but must be carefully planned in advance of execution to produce satisfactory results.
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From a comparison of the capabilities of fighter-bombers and medium bombers, it is apparent that the fighter-bomber excels for employment in close-in air cooperation under all conditions, except those where area or pattern bombing is required.
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The field of employment for which the medium bomber is particularly adapted is that of Second Phase operations, including all targets which require pattern or area bombing, or a sudden, heavy concentration. Its suitability for night operations makes it a complementary arm to the fighter-bomber, by providing a means for around-the-clock air operations which give the enemy no rest.
and
page 311
A-26: The A-26, which was a development of the A-20, was a marked improvement over the latter in bomb carrying capacity and performance. With respect to bomb load, it compared favorably with the weight carrying capacity of the B-26, although it does not possess the same versatility for loading. The volume of fire power represented by its eighteen forward firing .50 caliber guns, upper turret included, was not employed due to the impracticability of low-level attack with an airplane of this size.
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It is felt that an increase in bomb-carrying capacity and speed would have been realized by the elimination of this excess armament and armor. The A-26 was obsolescent when it reached the theater, if it is considered that enemy defenses and the nature of its own attacks did not make such heavy armament necessary.
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The operating crew of two to four men, according to position in formation, was economical in comparison to the B-26. The opinion has been expressed, however, that the airplane would have been improved by provision for a co-pilot. The location and multiplicity of bombing controls increased the pilot's burden when trying to maintain position in formation. Experience snowed that this factor resulted in an increase in the number of abortive and noneffective sorties.
2) EDWARD B. WESTERMANN, Lt. Col., USAF,"Sword in the Heavens": German Ground-based Air Defenses, 1914-1945, 380pp., Ph.D., University of North Carolina, 2000.
It was published as "Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914-1945" in November 12, 2001
See:
http://www.amazon.com/Flak-German-Anti- ... WESTERMANN
The book concentrated on Luftwaffe strategic flak as opposed to light flak, but the institutional and operation background to Luftwaffe flak can be matched elsewhere. This is what Westerman said regards light flak --
page 197
One veteran of Bomber Command described his impression of the system during a raid in early 1941:
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The only lighting was masses of blinding searchlights
stretching along the Dutch and German coastline and
strategically placed along the German/Dutch border and
surrounding all major cities and towns. Accompanying the
searchlights were batteries of heavy calibre anti-aircraft
guns and light flak guns. The latter were to prevent flying
attacks and were 'hosepiped' into the sky.
He then remarked that night fighters loitered "near the cones of the
searchlights, so any British bomber caught in them was 'easy meat'."159
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The system, although certainly not impenetrable, obviously earned the respect of British bomber crews. The searchlight batteries also were critical in assisting German night fighters; a point often overlooked in discussions of the effectiveness of ground-based air defenses during the war. Third, the above totals also highlighted the success enjoyed by the light flak batteries whether alone or in combination with heavy flak guns. Indeed, these guns were effective at altitudes between 5,400 feet and 6,500 feet and posed a significant threat to R.A.F.operations against ports and airfields.
3) "The History of Flak lntelligence" By Earl W. Thomson, Colonel. Coast Artillery Corps, COAST ARTillERY JOURNAL, July- Aug 1946 pages 16 - 22
Pages 17 - 18
The Coast Artillery in estimating the effectiveness of a harbor defense has always drawn circles on its maps at maximum range of the guns and mortars. Overlapping circiles in certain areas showed an effective defense. The same technique will give an approximate estimate of antiaircraft defenses, if the circiles are drawn with a radius equal to the horizontal range for the altitude of the attack. Colored pencile, cross-hatching, and red danger zones where numerous circiles overlap will show the air commander, with even the most rudimentary understanding of antiaircraft, that certain zones or courses are dangerous.
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Early flak analysis of the Twelfth air force in the Mediterranean, the Fifth Air Force and Thirteenth in the Pacific, and the Navy, all followed the gun circle method.
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and
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Page 21
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AuTOMATIC WEAPONs COMPuTER
The original flak computers were for high altitudes and for heavy guns only. The need for estimating the effectiveness of automatic weapons, 20mm, 2Smm, 40mm for low flying planes was evident, particularly to the Ninth Air Force in the pre D-Day planning, and to the Navy for their glide and dive bombers. The lesson of Ijmuiden had not been forgotten. In one o£: the early flak classes at Davis an automatic weapons computer was attempted, but was never published. Captain Norman H. Ball, CAC, in peacetime a mathematics professor at the Naval Academy and Lieutenant Frederick G. Kingt CAC, in the spring of 1944 analyzed several sets of data from the Antiaircx:aft Board automatic weapons practices. These data showed that the probability of hits was not only a function of time of Bight, but also of the tracking rate in the slant plane. These two antiaircraft officers from then on worked closely with a group of Navy Department civilian analysts, among whom were Drs. Jastram and Steenrod, and numerous automatic weapons computers, for low level, dive and glide bombing were developed late in 1944 and early in 1945.
page 22
...Late in 1944 and early in 1945 accurate flak data was difficult to obtain in the P~cific area, and many times flak officers reverted to peripheral gun circles as thi best solution under the conditions of inaccurate data.
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later on the same page.
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(d) Automatic Weapons Flak Analysis. A satisfactory method of flak analysis against automatic weapons has not yet been worked out, although target centered computers were constructed for glide and dive bombing. With accurate firing data from Fort Bliss, this should be accomplished. It is just possible that the use of computers may be abandoned, and effectiveness will include factors of terrain and sun, which are now neglected in flak computation, but are very important in operational planning for low level attacks.
4) THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, The Fifth Air Force in THE War Against Japan, Military Analysis Division, June 1947
This is what the 5th AF said about it tactics in the USSBS --
Page 76
TacticsThe shortage of specialized aircraft due to the relative priority of the Pacific war forced the development of tactics to permit all types of aircraft to carry out any required mission.
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The coordinated attack utilized medium or high altitude bombers initially to beat down anti-aircraft and thus to cover the approach of strafers which were assigned pin point targets. This proved most effective. Further development of coordinating low altitude attack, with leading units assigned to neutralize enemy defenses and to screen following units attacking primary targets made this method a favored means of attack against the Japanese.
Note that "screening" mentioned above meant with air-laid smoke from Chemical Warfare Service M-10 smoke tanks and M-47 WP smoke bombs.
Page 87
Thus we find the initial factors of terrain affording the enemy screened approach to our bases, inadequate early warning and a shortage of fighters. These factors developed the theory that our most effective defense against enemy bombardment was to seek out his aircraft on their bases and destroy them on the ground. In the preparation of every campaign our fighters and our light and medium bombardment concentrated on this offensive role as the best means of air defense.
